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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To interrogate the concept of personhood and its application to care practices for people
with dementia.
Method: We outline the work of Tom Kitwood on personhood and relate this to conceptualisations of
personhood in metaphysics and in moral philosophy.
Results: The philosophical concept of personhood has a long history. The metaphysical tradition
examines the necessary and sufﬁcient qualities that make up personhood such as agency,
consciousness, identity, rationality and second-order reﬂexivity. Alternative viewpoints treat
personhood as a matter of degree rather than as a superordinate category. Within moral philosophy
personhood is treated as a moral status applicable to some or to all human beings.
Conclusion: In the light of the multiple meanings attached to the term in both metaphysics and moral
philosophy, personhood is a relatively unhelpful concept to act as the foundation for developing
models and standards of care for people with dementia. Care, we suggest, should concentrate less on
ambiguous and somewhat abstract terms such as personhood and focus instead on supporting
people’s existing capabilities, while minimising the harmful consequences of their incapacities.
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Dementia has become a matter of growing concern at the
global level (Abbott, 2011). At the same time, the term itself
has been subject to criticism leading the American Psychiatric
Association to replace it with the phrase ‘major neurocogni-
tive disorder’ in its latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual (DSM-5; Sachdev et al., 2014). Eschewing the old
idea of dementia as ‘madness’ this new terminology instead
emphasises the presence of neurocognitive deﬁcits as the
condition’s deﬁning feature. In the process, signiﬁcant decline
in several distinct domains of cognitive function are identiﬁed
as the necessary criteria for the diagnosis (APA, 2013). By ‘sig-
niﬁcant’ is implied deﬁcits interfering with independence in
everyday activities; by ‘several domains’ is meant deﬁcits in
such areas as learning and memory, in complex attention, lan-
guage use, executive function, social cognition and percep-
tual motor skills. Leaving to one side the exact meaning of
such terminology, the general thrust is to narrow the diagnos-
tic focus upon ‘neurocognition’  cognitive deﬁcits attribut-
able to underlying neurological pathology.
Such deﬁcits are not the kind of distinct, localised impair-
ments arising from developmental or acquired pathology
such as in the case of learning disorders or stroke. Rather they
are impairments of what many might consider the basic infra-
structure that supports the individual’s agency, awareness,
communication, judgement and reasoning. Dementia  or
major neurocognitive disorder  by deﬁnition then seems to
threaten the identity and self-hood of the individual at risk,
leading earlier writers to see dementia as ‘the loss of self’
(Cohen & Eisdorfer, 2001) or ‘loss of the person’ (Sweeting &
Gilhooly, 1997). Subsequently this perspective has been chal-
lenged on two grounds  ﬁrst that it exaggerates the extent
of deﬁcits experienced by people who develop dementia and
second because it misrepresents what a person or ‘person-
hood’ really is (Downs, 1997; Kitwood, 1993; 1997b). The ﬁrst
is a matter of empirical enquiry evidenced in the research of,
for example, Fazio and Mitchell (2009); Howorth and Saper
(2003) and Clare, Markova, Verhey, and Kenny (2005). Such
research is not the focus of this paper which addresses the lat-
ter issue of the validity of the concept in dementia.
Writers concerned with improving the care of people with
dementia have privileged the importance of ‘personhood’ as
the focus of care. Acknowledging the personhood of people
with dementia has become one of the deﬁning aspects of pol-
icy and practice in dementia care (NICE, 2011; Nufﬁeld Council
on Bioethics, 2009; Thomas & Milligan, 2015). For many of
those grappling with the issue of personhood and dementia,
the work of Tom Kitwood has been a touchstone (Baldwin &
Capstick, 2007). In a number of works, Kitwood outlined what
he saw as the fundamental denial of personhood in many
care settings for people with dementia (Kitwood, 1993;
Kitwood, 1997a; Kitwood & Bredin, 1992). He asserted that
under the inﬂuence of the extreme individualism dominating
Western societies, he felt personhood has been reduced to
two criteria: autonomy and rationality (Kitwood, 1997a, p. 9).
The reduction of personhood to such individualised notions
of cognitive competence, he argued, has profound implica-
tions for the moral recognition of people with mental impair-
ments. As a counter to this, Kitwood contended that
personhood should be conceptualised more broadly, where
relationships and moral solidarity are included as founda-
tional principles to overcome ‘a social psychology that is
malignant in its effects’ (Kitwood, 1997a, p. 14).
While much has been written since on the importance of
maintaining personhood for people with dementia (Innes,
Archibald, & Murphy, 2004), Kitwood and other advocates of
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person-centred care for dementia have not explored the vari-
ous meanings attached to personhood nor why personhood
has been such a difﬁcult status for people with dementia to
achieve. In this paper we seek to address the use of the con-
cept of personhood and its utility for dementia care. Our aim
is to provide an implicit critique of Kitwood’s position and
those narratives of care that are derived from it. As part of this
argument we will outline how thinking about personhood
depends on ideas of agency and autonomy, consciousness
and memory, self-hood and personal identity. Each of these
concepts has been proposed as constitutive of personhood
by various thinkers. Differences between these positions
result in multiple possible versions of personhood with the
result that some have considered the very idea of personhood
‘logically confused and morally objectionable’ (Sapontzis,
1981, p. 607). His and other writers’ critiques (e.g. Beauchamp,
1999; Gordijn, 1999) illustrate some of the difﬁculties of
employing personhood as an essential focus through which
to orient the narratives and practices of care for people with
dementia.
We are undertaking this task, not to undermine the moti-
vations lying behind person-centred care nor the advocacy of
the rights of persons with dementia but rather to avoid what
we identify as a potentially unhelpful gap developing
between an increasingly professionalised rhetoric of ‘person
centred care’ and the everyday social realities facing those
who provide such care. There is a danger, we argue, that in
placing such a confused and confusing concept as person-
hood at the centre of any set of organisational practices of
care it risks undermining the basic moral imperative1 of care
that is central to society’s responses to disabling old age.
The ambiguity of ‘persons’
Responding to what he considered the lack of any theory
guiding the care of people with dementia, Kitwood made per-
sonhood central to his approach (Kitwood & Bredin, 1992, p.
270). At the outset he made little reference to others’ theories
of personhood, limiting himself to the view that (a) person-
hood was not so much given as ‘acquired’ as a result of rela-
tionships with others, presaged upon that between infant
and mother/caregiver (Kitwood & Bredin, 1992, p. 276) and
(b) that being or becoming a person gives an individual moral
status, making him or her worthy of moral respect (Kitwood &
Bredin, 1992, p. 275). Elsewhere, he makes reference to the
work of Martin Buber and his concept of a person as a ‘thou–I’
relationship  referring to the way of individuals relating to
another as a ‘pure being’ without any degree of instrumental-
ity (Kitwood, 1997b, p. 56). Personhood is presented not as
a concept capable of empirical veriﬁcation (i.e. what are the
necessary conditions of personhood and does this individual/
species possess some or all of them) but as a statement of
moral fact. A person is a ‘thou’; recognising and responding
to another as a ‘thou’ is the essence of making that person a
person.
Personhood has been used in philosophy long before
Buber. Although its conceptual history is complicated the
explication of personhood within philosophy has been either
a moral or a metaphysical category (Beauchamp, 1999,
p. 309). Both are responses to the question ‘what is a person?’
They address issues of identity and by implication, self-hood.
While the nature of personal identity and self occupies the
domain of metaphysics, in moral philosophy the term is
concerned less with personal identity than with the moral
standing of persons. Insofar as dementia is a subject of inter-
est to these disciplines, both psychiatry and psychology have
approached personhood and dementia in metaphysical terms
(e.g. Hughes, 2013; Hughes, Louw, & Sabat, 2006). Law, medi-
cine and theology on the other hand have been more
involved with moral considerations of personhood as ‘a foun-
dational concept in many systems of ethics’ informing much
medico-legal debate (Dresser, 1995; Dworkin, 1993; Jaworska,
1999; Kittay & Carlson, 2010; Post, 2006).
A key problem addressed by Jens Ohlin is whether the con-
cept of the person is a necessary requirement for human rights
claims (Ohlin, 2005). Ohlin notes how legal systems place per-
sonhood at the centre of human rights. He questions whether
the determination of such rights follows from the determina-
tion of personhood. Ohlin asks whether it is necessary to prove
that this person is indeed a person in order to grant him or her
rights and contends that in practice personhood serves as a
‘place marker’, treating those who have rights as persons and
those who do not as non-persons. He introduces a further
point  what Parﬁt (2003b) has called the argument from
below  namely that it is the necessary constituents of per-
sonhood, such as possessing consciousness, and not person-
hood itself that determine moral status and in turn confer
rights. In this formulation, no additional value is conferred by
the status of being a person: its constituents have already
done the work. Given these differences in approach which
treat it as either metaphysical compound or moral status, we
aim to consider both aspects of personhood in turn.
Personhood as metaphysical identity
‘Personal identity’ and ‘self’ are concepts that have long been
central to metaphysics. In reviewing the sources of the self
within the Western intellectual tradition, Charles Taylor has
distinguished between an inner ‘me’ and an outer ‘world’
made up of objects and things that are not ‘me’. This concep-
tualisation constitutes ‘a historically limited mode of self-inter-
pretation … dominant in the modern West’ (Taylor, 1992, p.
111). Whether or not this is the case, the history of this distinc-
tion is taken as that formulated by Rene Descartes when
he distinguished between knowledge gained from within 
the cogito  and knowledge gained from the without  ‘the
material world and its quasi mechanical workings’ (Taylor,
1992, p. 156). Descartes asked whether it was possible to
understand the nature of self and personal identity without
resorting to forms of external knowledge based upon the
material body. One solution to this problem was to treat ‘self’
and ‘personhood’ as entities that could not be reduced to, or
assimilated within the category of material bodies. Instead
such capacities were seen as existing in a contingent relation-
ship with the body, a relationship that was irreducible to what
Strawson has called ‘basic’ or ‘primary’ particulars  namely
matter (Strawson, 1971). If self and personal identity are seen
as the constituents of ‘persons’, one way of understanding
who or what a ‘person’ is, can be found in the answer to
whether he or she is capable of ‘owning’ (i.e. accepting as
mine) his or her states of consciousness. While states of con-
sciousness may vary in time and form, what gives them their
unity is the necessity of their being a person’s consciousness
and not just being a thing sufﬁcient in and of itself.
A doyen of early Enlightenment thinking, John Locke,
began his Essay Concerning Human Understanding with a


























similar goal to that of Descartes, thinking about what consti-
tutes the self or subject, free from any preconceptions. He
wanted to establish a more objective understanding of
humanity based on the consciousness of a distinct self which
he saw as the hallmark of a person. For Locke, personal iden-
tity existed because of consciousness, or rather that aspect of
consciousness that identiﬁes itself with all previous actions
and experiences ‘in what bodies soever they appear or what
substances soever that consciousness adheres to’ (Locke,
1975, p. 347). For Locke, the consciousness of identity was all.
This position was later challenged by another Enlightenment
thinker, David Hume who pointed out that because all con-
sciously entertained ideas, impressions and perceptions are
essentially ﬂeeting, consciousness is not continuous but frag-
mentary. The conscious self must be therefore equally frag-
mentary. What gave conscious thoughts and experiences
their sense of continuity and underlying unity was memory
which served as the uniﬁer of what otherwise would be a frag-
mentary self (or selves). Had people no memory, they would
have no means of tying together one impression with
another, no knowledge of ‘that chain of causes and effects
which constitute our self or person’ (Hume, 1978, p. 261).
Although Hume’s position was challenged by Thomas
Reid, subsequent enquiries into the identity of persons went
into abeyance. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant was
the forerunner of a different approach based upon the idea of
personhood as status. Unlike Locke and Hume, Kant’s concep-
tion of a person refers not to its metaphysical components
but rather to a universal abstract property that renders human
beings ‘ends’ in themselves and treats as irrelevant any bio-
graphical or biological elements of distinctiveness  what
Radin has called ‘bare abstract rational agents’ (Radin, 1982,
p. 967). While such a position may avoid any deeper engage-
ment with a metaphysics of the person, it was an important
precursor for viewing personhood in terms of its associated
rights’ claims. A clearer articulation of this position was made
by the idealist philosopher Hegel who outlined the imperative
to ‘be a person and respect others as persons’ (Hegel, 1991,
p. 35). For Hegel, all such rights are personal and derive from
the possession of the rationality of every human being. Given
the universality of personhood as a rights holding status for
Kant and Hegel, such a status cannot be further qualiﬁed by
any individual, physical or social particularities.
Echoes of Hume’s position reappear in contemporary theo-
ries of the self and personhood, particularly those which rep-
resent personal identity as a fundamentally ‘discursive’
narrative. In his book ‘Oneself as Another’ Paul Ricoeur distin-
guishes between two aspects of identity  sameness (idem)
and self-hood (ipse) (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 116). Identity as same-
ness he argues can be seen as the property of substances 
equally applicable to human beings or to items of clothing
such as suits. Identity as selfhood does not work that way. As
Ricoeur puts it, selfhood is a question of whom, not what, we
are. Character (or personality), he suggests, lies somewhere
between self-sameness and self-hood such that the stability
or sameness of character elides ‘who I am’ with ‘what I am’.
Self-hood is unequivocally about the former. For Ricoeur, self-
hood (who I am) is a matter of what Alistair MacIntyre termed
‘the narrative unity of a life’ (MacIntyre, cited in Ricoeur, 1992,
p. 158). This narrative unity, Ricoeur claims, enables identity
to link both aspects of identity with one another, creating ‘the
permanence, in time, of character and that of self-constancy’
(Ricoeur, 1992, p. 166). Ricoeur treats the self as the central
part of our identity as persons alongside our sameness as both
‘matter’ and ‘character’. In that sense the term ‘person’  or
personal identity  includes the idea of self and ‘other’.
Persons and selves
Although Locke, Hume and Ricoeur have treated the person
as more or less equivalent to the self, a number of contempo-
rary philosophers have sought to distinguish between them.
Remaining the same ‘person’ is not considered equivalent to
remaining the same ‘self’. Even if, as Schechtman (1994) has
put it, ‘person-identity’ and ‘self-identity’ ought to be co-
extensive ‘for a richer and fuller life’, such co-extensivity is nei-
ther theoretically nor empirically necessary. Selves can remain
the same selves even if they no longer are the same persons
(and presumably, vice versa). Is a degree of co-extensivity
between personal identity and self-identity therefore required
as a criterion of ‘personhood’, in the same way that a degree
of psychological continuity is required for personal identity to
persist over time? Parﬁt argues that there are so many
obstacles to determining whether or not human beings retain
a continuous personal identity that it is more useful to con-
sider this as a matter of degree rather than of categorical pres-
ence or absence (Parﬁt, 1984). For Parﬁt, there are always
degrees of psychological continuity in individuals’ lives. These
may be more evident in some people’s lives than in others
and in some periods of people’s lives than at others. Personal
identity and selfhood are therefore better thought of as mat-
ters of degree, Parﬁt claims, rather than as singular entities,
such that individuals are sometimes more and sometimes less
‘themselves’. The self remains continually subject to what
could be called degrees of narrative unity.
Rom Harre sees the narrative unity of the self as but one
aspect of ‘self-hood’. Two other aspects of self-hood  ‘selves’ 2
and 3 – depend not on any individual narrativity but upon
others’ attributions and narratives (Harre, 1991). These other
forms of self are either the external attributions of a person's
character or the social identities and roles the individual plays
(or has played). They represent not positions of subjective
agency but social identities or socially constructed selves,
reﬂected in and by the mirror of society (cf. Mauss, 1985; Mead,
1962). While these other forms of self may serve the role of
identifying or distinguishing one person from others, they locate
responsibility for conferring that identity upon the attributions,
discourses and interpretations of others that may (or may not)
be ‘internalised’ by the individual whose identity is so attributed.
The notion of ‘self’ that is represented by these selves 2 and 3 is
one prominent in anthropology and the social sciences, it is one
that is presaged upon the denial of agency, autonomy and per-
sonal authority, and consequently renders personhood little
more than a Western ‘conceit’ (Callegaro, 2013).
There are nevertheless ‘limit conditions’ to the narrative
self, when ‘radical enough psychological change literally
brings about a loss of identity’ (Schechtman, 2003, p. 242).
One element underlying this ‘limit condition’ is the rate of
personal change or loss. Slower rates of change represent
greater possibilities for maintaining continuity compared to
rapid, violent changes. A second limiting condition for main-
taining sufﬁcient self-sameness (or personal identity) is what
she terms ‘narrative coherence’. By this, she is referring to the
extent to which the individual can maintain a coherent story
of continuing to be the ‘I’ he or she always was, despite
marked or even sudden changes to life, self and


























circumstances. Even if these considerations capture some of
the conditions sustaining the psychological continuity of self,
‘they are’, she argues, still ‘missing a piece and this piece… is
empathic access’ (Schechtman, 2003, p. 245). By ‘empathic
access’ she means when a person ‘retains some sympathy for
the psychological features of the life phase to which [s/he]
retains access’ (Schechtman, 2003, p. 255). So long as an
individual retains some memory of past phases or periods in
his or her life and these memories reﬂect feeling part of
that memory, this bond of ‘warm memory’ preserves psycho-
logical continuity and thereby the individual’s survival as a
self-same self.
Empathic access is important for Schechtman, as is the
anticipation of loss and the disconnection from the selves
and others that have ﬁgured in the individual’s past. Perhaps
as Parﬁt claims, an individual’s survival  as a person or as a
self is unimportant and what matters are the processes con-
stituting their survival, those of managing change, of main-
taining coherence and retaining these affective memories
(Parﬁt, 2003a). Whether or not individuals retain their self-
sameness may be less important than the retention of their
empathic connections with their past, to which Schechtman
has referred (Schechtman, 2003).
Persons as agents
So far our attention has been upon consciousness as experi-
ence  of memory and feelings, the sense of being ‘oneself’,
of feeling ‘connected’ to one’s past. But as Korsgaard has
pointed out ‘a person is both active and passive, both an
agent and a subject of experiences’ (Korsgaard, 1989:, p. 101).
Harry Frankfurt questioned formulations of personhood that
relied simply on some combination of a particular human
body and its consciousness (Frankfurt, 1971). He argued that
‘one essential difference between persons and other creatures
is to be found in the structure of a person’s will’ (Frankfurt,
1971, p. 6). He made the distinction between the presence of
desires and motives  primary intentions or drives  and the
capacity to make choices and what he called ‘second order
desires’ or ‘volitions of the second order’ (Frankfurt, 1971,
p. 10). Frankfurt argues that the presence of such second-
order volitions means wanting to have (or own) or not to
have (disown) the particular desires that one has. Individuals
who though possessing rationality have no such second-order
volitions, no desires to be other than how they are, how they
act, what they want are thus not persons. These latter he calls
‘wantons’, humans perhaps, but not persons. Korsgaard has
argued that what determines personhood or personal identity
is not the sameness of an individual’s appearance, attitudes,
habits or ways of life, but the continuing authorship of change
(Korsgaard, 1989, p. 123). This notion of authorship  of recog-
nising and owning though not necessarily keeping constant
one’s acts and desires, motives and plans  resonates with Ric-
oeur’ s narrative unity of the self. However what Frankfurt and
Korsgaard stress is not just narrative but ‘performative’ agency,
doing what one intended to do.2
Dennett too has drawn upon Frankfurt’s notion of ‘second-
order volition’ in outlining the criteria which he believed
must be met in order for individuals to possess ‘personhood’
(Dennett, 1976). To have the status of ‘personhood’, he
argued an individual must be capable of having second-order
intentions as well as possessing rationality; must be able to
be judged as possessing consciousness; must be treated by
others as if he or she is a person; must be capable of recipro-
cating others’ feelings, beliefs and attitudes; must be able to
communicate with others; and must be capable of self-
consciousness. In this formulation, neither continuity over
time nor identiﬁcation with past selves are necessary compo-
nents of personhood. Instead he emphasises the capacities or
qualities that an individual must possess and not their conti-
nuity over time. Dennett’s deﬁnition is not contingent upon
whether these qualities persist: an individual may acquire per-
sonhood without previously having had it and individuals can
lose personhood despite once having had it, in the sense of
gaining or losing these capacities or qualities.
In a crowded ﬁeld, other attempts have been made to
deﬁne the relationship between persons and agency drawing
upon similar ideas. Charles Taylor has raised the question in
the following way: ‘What do we mean by a person? Certainly
an agent, with purposes, desires, aversions and so forth. But
obviously more than this because many animals can be con-
sidered agents in this sense, but we don’t consider them per-
sons’ (Taylor, 1985, p. 237). Taylor treats agency per se as an
illustration of Frankfurt’s ﬁrst-order volitions or Dennett’s pri-
mary intentional systems. But as well as being ‘an agent who
has an understanding of self as an agent’ (Taylor, 1985,
p. 263), he points out that ‘we conceive of [a person] as a spe-
cial kind of agent, an agent-plus, who can also make life plans,
hold values, choose’ (Taylor, 1985, p. 261). This seems to
reﬂect Dennett’s criteria of reﬂexivity informing actions. But
then he states: ‘it is not just that we are aware of ourselves as
agents… [but]…we also have a sense of certain standards
which apply to us as self-aware agents’ (Taylor, 1985, p. 263).
For Taylor, then, persons are not just agents, neither are they
simply reﬂexive or second-order agents; rather, they are moral
agents, capable of experiencing guilt and shame. Agency per
se is a necessary but insufﬁcient aspect of being a person;
even metaphysical agency is insufﬁcient. Moral agency is
demanded. By placing ‘moral agency’ above ‘metaphysical
agency’, Taylor distinguishes between the initiation and plan-
ning of behaviour and planning against a set of internal crite-
ria which can be articulated before and after an action,
realising an agency that is necessarily attached to a moral
imperative. For Taylor, this distinction is important. Human
beings  as persons  are not just capable of choosing to do
something, of being aware of and considering that choice.
They have the capacity of wanting to do other than what they
do; of wanting to be other than what they are. This is what
Taylor calls moral agency. It brings us back to Kant and per-
sonhood as moral standing or status.
Personhood and moral status
More clearly than Taylor, Dennett differentiated between
metaphysical and moral notions of a ‘person’. To transform
personhood into moral personhood, he states, calls for an
extra dimension of ‘accountability’. As an example, he uses
the position of an insane man who is not treated in law as
accountable despite the fact that he interacts with other,
non-insane persons in ways otherwise ‘indistinguishable from
normal personal relations’ (Dennett, 1976, p. 177). While
accountability is not required for such ‘basic’ (metaphysical)
forms of personhood-agency, it is required for ‘moral’ agency.
Moral agency confers a ‘higher’ order of personhood than
mere ‘metaphysical’ agency. This raises the question of how
far moral agency, moral identity and moral status converge in


























thinking about personhood within an ethical or moral philo-
sophical tradition.
Metaphysics has pursued the relationship between
agency, identity and personhood (or self-hood). These inqui-
ries subsume two distinct motives. One, a relatively neutral
line of questioning, asks what confers unity to individuals 
how and to what extent do people develop and retain a sense
of their personal identity, of being the person that they are? In
short what are the constituents of personhood and people’s
sense of self? The other, less neutral, but perhaps of greater
social import, is what distinguishes persons from other sen-
tient beings, what makes individuals ‘human’ and what conse-
quences should follow from that? While the search for the
necessary criteria of personhood may seem a metaphysical
inquiry, a search to know the self ‘from the inside’, inseparable
from such inquiries is a concern with status or standing and
the judging of persons. It is more moral philosophy than
metaphysics that underlies Kitwood’s account of personhood
and person-centred care.
Just as metaphysical concepts of personhood seem to pos-
sess degrees of capacity, so too does the concept of the moral
standing of persons. As Perring notes in his discussion of
medical ethics, ‘[most] approaches deciding who deserves
treatment and what are the rights of the patient implicitly
assume the notion of 'degrees of personhood’ ' (Perring,
1997). Replacing metaphysical with moral personhood does
not avoid having to confront such issues; indeed it sharpens
such confrontations. If personhood is a matter of degree, the
rights which an individual might claim must also be matters
of degree  and thereby subject at the very least to some
kind of negotiation. Much contemporary philosophy seems to
have abandoned the attempt to deﬁne a stable continuous
self opting instead for a status model of personhood. Like any
other status, however, this too is contingent, relational and
normative  in short a matter of degree.
For some ethicists, this poses such serious problems that
they would prefer to abandon personhood as status alto-
gether arguing that 'instead of encouraging the development
of morality as an all-pervasive fundamental world outlook, it
justiﬁes restricting moral concern to the observance of a small
number of rules’ (Sapontzis, 1981, p. 618). For others, restrict-
ing the concept of moral personhood to a purely normative
concept means that ‘the ascription of personhood is nothing
but our declaration that an entity is a valid object of our moral
concern’ (Ohlin, 2005, p. 237). The search for a basis for moral
concern and the application of human rights must therefore
lie elsewhere and not in the concept of personhood. Farah
and Heberlein, reviewing the potential neuroscientiﬁc bases
for ‘personhood’, concluded that since it is impossible, empiri-
cally, to defend any speciﬁc criteria for personhood, ‘rather
than ask whether someone or something is a person, we
should ask how much capacity exists for enjoying [such quali-
ties as] intelligence, self awareness, etc.’ (Farah & Heberlein,
2007, p. 46). Yet, as these authors also conclude personhood
narratives persist. They resolve this conundrum by claiming
that personhood may be a ‘functional illusion’ that reﬂects
the way human brains process information about other
human beings.
Personhood clearly has a powerful presence in society. It is
not easy to dismiss the term outright, or even replace it with
more elemental terms such as ‘rationality’, ‘judgement’ or
‘autonomy’. Consequently, rather than seeking to dissect or
demonstrate the speciﬁc qualities of personhood, some
authors have suggested that it might be more straightforward
to demand individuals’ rights as of right and using Kant to see
the individual as a ‘rights-holder’, asserting that persons are
‘ends-in-themselves’(Kant, 1895). In effect this view of the
thin, bare personhood of Kantian ethics (Mackenzie 2007,
p. 277) ‘casts persons as independent self-sufﬁcient holders of
rights’ (Erde, 1999, p. 146). Being a rights holder is being a per-
son and vice versa.
The variable nature of moral identity
Contrasting with this theme of bare personhood, other inter-
locutors have postulated more graduated perspectives
evinced for example in developmental studies of personhood
and the self. Some philosophers and psychologists have
argued that the sense of self emerges and develops through
a process of emergent ‘second-order’ systems of control over
the individual’s actions, desires, wants and wishes rather than
being present from the start, unchanged and unchanging.
Such a perspective is evident in Walter Mischel’s studies of
‘delay of gratiﬁcation’ in the development of a robust, agentic
self among children (Mischel, 1974), or in Piaget’s concept of
human development as replacing a limited and limiting set of
biological capabilities with successive higher-order, acquired
capabilities (Piaget, 1976) or again, in Vygotsky’s concept of
the internalisation of ‘secondary’ thinking through language
and tool use (Vygotsky, 1978). Beauchamp (1999) provides a
succinct articulation of this point when he argues that we ﬁrst
become human, then become human selves, and ﬁnally
acquire by degrees the status of personhood, eventually
learning to exercise ‘genuine’ agency  in the sense of having
volitional control over our desires.
These various approaches represent a ‘developmentalist’
notion of what Taylor has called ‘agency-plus’. The possibility
of a decline is also implied. If moral agency and self-hood are
matters of degree and development, the moral status of per-
sonhood must be similarly qualiﬁed. If the acquisition of per-
sonhood status is a matter of human development  it too
must be subject to human ageing and decline. As metaphysi-
cal concerns turn to moral concerns, the developmentalist
approach becomes more salient and more problematic. While
metaphysicians of personal identity have considered ques-
tions of sameness arising from the processes of ageing, the
general consensus has been that changes brought about
slowly and imperceptibly, such as those occurring as a conse-
quence of ageing, do not pose any major threat to the iden-
tity of persons. The self is assumed to maintain its identity
throughout life, through the affective bonds of memory and
narrative, including its own narratives of growing up and
growing old. But if personhood is thought of as an acquired
status, constituted by increasing reﬂexivity, higher-order
thinking and ‘agency plus’, and if these qualities serve as nec-
essary precursors of moral standing, then the consequence is
that moral standing itself must wax and wane over the life-
course.
It is generally accepted that infants are neither capable of
explicit declarative memory3 nor do they display reﬂexivity
and thus have no moral agency. But does their lack of sufﬁ-
cient moral agency have any bearing upon their moral
status  of being a legitimate object of others’ care and con-
cern? If both personhood and moral agency are developmen-
tally acquired, the self or personal identity of the child
remains contiguous. The acquisition of new qualities and


























capacities adds to but does not render unidentiﬁable the ear-
lier self even if it cannot be remembered. A similar argument
can be made about ageing: the self remains even if the quali-
ties or attributes of personhood and moral agency are com-
promised. But the symmetry is by no means perfect. While
age may compromise the attributes of personhood and qual-
ify the extent of moral agency, were age to eliminate some or
all of the underpinning attributes, could it not be argued that
personhood as moral status can be lost through agedness?
In the context of what has been described as the new ‘neu-
roculture’ (Williams, Higgs, & Katz, 2012) changes in corporeal
being are seen as sources of change in consciousness and
mental capacities and hence in the capacity to perform as a
self or person. If changes occur in those structures of the age-
ing brain that support neuronal functioning, does this imply a
diminution of the infrastructure of the self? Or should they be
seen as part of the ever changing external conditions that the
self as person can and does re-interpret  because of its
‘under-determination’ by its social cultural and biophysical
constituents (Sugarman, 2005, p. 806)? In other words should
the symmetry of development and decline be qualiﬁed such
that the processes of acquiring the status of personhood are
not deemed to be the same as the processes that compro-
mise or degrade agency and identity? Having become per-
sons, perhaps individuals remain persons, and having
acquired moral status as persons might they not retain moral
status, at least under normal conditions.
This leads to an alternative formulation: is it only abnormal
development or abnormal decline that can disrupt the conti-
nuities of agency and personhood, and is dementia an exam-
ple of such a disruption? For Kant there is an assumption that
personhood is a status that persists, along with the necessary
rights of such persons to justice fairness and moral consider-
ation. But Kant’s abstract personhood assumes an inherent
rationality that persists throughout adult life; how Kant might
interpret the potential loss of moral agency has been a matter
of some speculation, to the extent that some have argued
that Kantian ethics would make pre-emptive suicide in the
face of dementia a moral desideratum, sacriﬁcing one’s self-
same body rather than losing one’s self-directing moral
agency (Cooley, 2007). Clearly once one qualiﬁes personhood
as a matter of degree, for whatever reason, such qualiﬁcations
extend equally to its moral as to its metaphysical status
Conclusions
Our intention in interrogating the notion of personhood and
its relationship to dementia has been to point out how much
more complex the concept is than it ﬁrst seems. Kitwood’s
assumptions about personhood, we argue, confound meta-
physical with moral philosophy, while leaving open the pros-
pect that the only conditions threatening adult personhood
are those that arise when the circumstances of dementia are
transformed by a malignant social psychology. By taking the
position that personhood is an attribute of relationships, not
capabilities, Kitwood sidesteps consideration of what we have
termed the component approach to personhood  those
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions that render personhood
possible. By treating personhood as a moral status demand-
ing certain rights, Kitwood has confounded the constitution
of personhood with the conditions for its existence, namely
that it exists in an ‘I-thou’ relationship, the responsibility for
which, though unspeciﬁed, implicitly is the carer’s. By
avoiding further considerations of personhood, Kitwood ends
up treating personhood as little more than a moral entity, ‘a
valid object of our moral concern’ (Ohlin, 2005) and as such,
deserving those rights that follow from being of ‘moral con-
cern’ without further questions or qualiﬁcation.
While we have no dispute with recognising that people
with dementia are and should be objects of moral concern, as
indeed should all human beings whatever their disabilities,
we also recognise that many people with dementia lack some
of the capabilities deemed to constitute metaphysical person-
hood  such as self-awareness, reﬂexivity, second-order voli-
tion and narrative unity and that such deﬁcits increase with
time. The problems with a personhood centred approach to
helping people with such impairments are twofold. In the ﬁrst
place, Kitwood’s approach fails to distinguish between main-
taining the moral standing of persons and preserving their
capabilities of performing personhood. The failure to recog-
nise this distinction places the burden of responsibility upon
other persons for sustaining the personhood of individuals
with dementia, not just in sustaining moral concern for them
(their moral status as persons), but in preserving their capabil-
ities for personhood (the metaphysical components of per-
sonhood). The failure to achieve the former is too easily
treated as a failure to realise the latter.
Secondly, as others have noted, Kitwood’s original concep-
tualisation of personhood was rooted in Christian theology in
which all humans have intrinsic worth. His later work aban-
doned this religious underpinning leaving it less coherent
and more relativist (Baldwin & Capstick, 2007, p. 180). Instead
of using personhood as a ‘superﬂuous, confusing and without
pragmatic use’ term ‘that can be easily used as a cover-up
concept’ (Gordijn, 1999, p. 356) to improve the position of
people with dementia, outside its everyday use, as persons,
people, etc., it might be better to avoid the term in profes-
sional and policy discourse. An alternative approach is to see
dementia care in terms of containing and contesting the
malign social imaginary of the fourth age (Gilleard & Higgs,
2010; Higgs & Gilleard, 2015). We have chosen this use of
words to contrast with Kitwood’s phrase ‘malignant social psy-
chology’ (or indeed Sabat’s (2006) ‘malignant positioning’)
because both these latter formulations stress inter-personal
rather than social processes. This does not mean neglecting
the study of individual agency, of memory, of narrative iden-
tity or of sense of self in people with dementia, neither does it
mean abandoning attempts to support people’s existing
capabilities while minimising the harmful consequences of
their incapacities. What may matter more is acknowledging
that most carers, paid as well as unpaid, can and do recognise
the moral standing of people with dementia and respond
through a moral imperative of care. Their care practices may
either deepen or lighten the darkness of the fourth age. To
consider how best to do this, we suggest, requires no moral
or metaphysical assertions about the 'personhood’ of people
with dementia, beyond the recognition of a common human-
ity and the taking of due care.
Notes
1. This term draws on Immanuel Kant’s Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphysics of Ethics (1895) and is discussed in Higgs and Gilleard
(2015).
2. The task of empirically demonstrating such intentionality and perfor-
mative agency is beyond the scope of this paper. Reviews of this


























research area can be found in Malle, Moses and Baldwin (2001) and
Lieberman (2007).
3. Evidence of the near total ‘amnesia’ for autobiographical events
before age 3 has most recently been reviewed in Bauer (2014).
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